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UNITED STATES
v.

Cert to CAS
(~ [CJ], Heaney, Becker [Sr.DJ,
cone.])

JACOBSEN, et ux.

Federal/Criminal

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely (w/extn)

Where a search by a private parcel carrier's

employees of a damaged package has resulted in the employees'
observation a white powder contained in the package, and the employees
~/

then turn over the package, with the white substance in plain view, to
law enforcement officers: whether the officers must obtain a search
~

-

warrant before conducting a chemical field test to determine whether
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•
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the substance is cocaine.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Employees of Federal

Express, a private company that delivers parcels, discovered that a
parcel entrusted to them for delivery to one D. Jacobs, Apple Valley,
Minn., had been damaged
in transit. Pursuant to company policy, the
......
employees opened the package to view its contents. Inside, they
discovered a 10 inch cardboard tube, sealed with "duct tape,"
cushioned by wads of newspaper.

The employees opened the tube, and

discovered that it contained a packet of white powder enclosed in four
~

clear plastic baggies.

Suspecting that the powder was a controlled

substance, they contacted the DEA.

They reinserted the plastic packet

in the cardboard tube, but did not reseal the tube.

The white

substance remained visible.
When the DEA agent arrived, he removed the plastic bags from
the tube and extracted from the packet a small portion of the

powder.~

He tested it chemically on the spot, and determined from the chemical .fee.(/
~

test that the substance was cocaine.

He also checked by computer the

address on the package, and determined that it was resps'.

Resp

Bradley Jacobsen's name appeared on several DEA reports suspecting him
of trafficking in cocaine.

The ~

--

agent obtained a warrant to search

Jacobsen's residence on the basis of the field test and the DEA
~

reports.

He then re-wrapped the package, and dressed in civilian

clothes delivered the package to Jacobsen's residence.

An hour later,

he returned to make the search with other DEA agents and the warrant.
Bradley Jacobsen answered the door.
that they had a warrant to search.

The agents announced

Jacobsen slammed the door in their

face, yelling "It's the police -- flush it!"

The police broke down

- 3 the door, and seized the remains of the cocaine, which included
paraphernalia, cocaine traces, and the burned remnants of the package
that had earlier been delivered.
arrested.

Jacobsen and his wife Donna were

Both were charged with a single count of possession with

intent to distribute cocaine and Bradley was charged with assault on a
federal officer.

The~

(D. Minn. MacLaughlin) denied resps'

suppression motion and permitted the seized materials to be introduced ./
against them.
3.

They were convicted on an all counts.
DECISION BELOW:

United States, 447

The CAS reversed, relying on

u.s. 649 (19SO).

~

~lter v.~

In Walter, a private carrier

delivered a package to the wrong company.

,~-

Employees of the company

opened the package, and discovered a number of film boxes purporting
to contain sexually explicit movies.

They opened some of the boxes

and held the film up to the light, but could not see what they
depicted.

They then contacted the FBI, which took the films back to

headquarters and screened them.

Determining that they were obscene,

they had them delivered, arrested the correct addressees, and
introduced the films in evidence against them.

This Court reversed

the conviction, finding that the FBI needed a warrant to screen the
films, even though they had come into government possession lawfully.
JUSTICE STEVENS' plurality opinion, said CAS, found that projection of
the films was a significant expansion of the search that had been
conducted previously by a private party.

Therefore, absent any

exigency, it could only be undertaken with a warrant.
Applying Walter to this case, the CAS said:

"The DEA agents' extension of the private search
precisely parallels that in Walter. In both cases, viewing

I

(\.,~~~

- 4 the objects with unaided v1s1on produced only an inference
of criminal activity. In both cases, government agents went
beyond the scope of the private search by using mechanical
or chemical means to discover the hidden nature of the
objects. The governmental activity represents a significant
extension of the private searches because it revealed the
content of the films in Walter and, here, the composition of
the powder. In the absence of exigent circumstances, which
the government does not allege, we hold the agents were
required to obtain a warrant authorizing the taking of
samples and analysis thereof." Pet. App. 6.
The CAB acknowledged that, "[i]n almost identical circumstances," the
CA6 held that a warrant was not required to conduct a chemical
analysis.

United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 920 (CA6 19B2}, cert.

denied, No. Bl-6942 (Oct. 12, 19B2}.

The CAB rejected Barry's

contention that Walter should be understood as a First Amendment case.
The chemical testing was necessary to obtaining the warrant to
search resps' home, and therefore the search and everything obtained
thereby was fruits of an unlawful search.
Sr. DJ Becker concurred, finding Walter to be controlling,
although he said he generally agreed with the views of the four
dissenters in that case.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

On the strength of the

ith Barry, its

assertion that the CAB decision is plainly
reasonable law enforcement efforts will be unduly burdened by this
decision, the SG requests a grant.

The substance had lawfully come

into the possession of the law enforcement agents, and when it was
delivered it was in plain view.

The chemical test to which the

substance was subjected was capable of revealing only this: whether
the substance was cocaine.

Surely in these circumstances, the test

invaded no reasonable privacy expectations.

The decision casts a

cloud over the legality of all field testing for narcotics, since in a

- 5 -

search incident to arrest, or a normal search based upon a warrant,
the officer does not have a warrant to test chemically any seized
materials.
For these reasons, Walter is distinguishable.

Viewing a film

discloses far more information than a chemical test of a white powder
-- a film may reveal much about the ideas and attitudes of the person
who made it and the recipient.

Moroever, the opinion of JUSTICE

STEVENS, with whom Justice Stewart joined, did rely at least in part
on the fact that First Amendment concerns were there implicated.
Field tests are important to law enforcement; in many cases,
requiring a warrant will unduly delay the progress of an
investigation.

~sps

____

argue that the decision below is compelled by Walter, and
.......

therefore cert. should not be granted.

Walter stands for the

proposition that the police may not, without a warrant or exigent
~

circumstances, go beyond the scope of a private search.
plainly did so here.

Barry is not in

The officers
the CA6 there

relied upon the fact that the methaqualone pills tested by the DEA
were discovered, once the package had been opened by Federal Express,
in bottles that were clearly labelled "methaqualone."

Because the

defendant had taken insufficient steps to protect against the risk of
exposure, the CA6 reasoned that he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.

Here, resps took many steps to keep secret the contents of

the package, even once it was opened.
Finally, law enforcement interests will not be severely hampered
here. This case deals only with whether a warrant must be obtained for
a chemical test where such would exceed the scope of a preceding

•

I
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private search on which the governm
does not implicate the "plain
cases, etc.

These are

This

cases, search incident to warrant
ere the materials have been "lawfully

seized," which resps
5.

relies to make its own.

to be different from this case.
the CAB's admission that its decision

DISCUSSION:

conflicts with Barry, although there is tension, the peculiar nature
of

_:he~ rr1 ~: cision

makes the conflict less than square.

The CA6

there first reasoned that the law enforcement officers should have
obtained a warrant before they went to the Federal Express office to
view the opened package: the search was therefore illegal if Barry had
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the package.

Then the CA6

reasoned that, because Barry had not attempted to disguise the fact
that the pill bottles contained contraband, he had no reasonable
expectation in the package once it was opened by Federal Express.
Walter was distinguished because it was a First Amendment case.
Therefore, once the officers had the pill bottles, they could make
their "routine" chemical testing without violating that case.

Thus,

the CA6 found a peculiar sort of unlawful warrantless search, but held
that Barry's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

Its

interpretation of Walter is at odds with the CAB's, however.
Walter may bear further explanation.
reverse there were divided.

The five Justices voting to

Justices Stevens and Stewart were

together on one opinion, Justices White and Brennan on another, and
Justice Marshall simply concurred in the judgment.
~

~he

The Chief Justice,

Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.

------------

Walter decision has First Amendment overtones, but the CAB's

interpretation of that decision was not wholly unreasonable given the

,
- 7 divergence of opinion in Walter.

Still, the SG's argument that the

CAB erred here is persuasive: there is little to distinguish the

------------------------chemical testing here from the chemical
field testing in typical plain
view seizures and even seizures incident to a warrant.

The intrusion

~

does seem lesser, perhaps, than screening a film.
Finally, the facts here may not be as unusual as one might
suppose.

In addition to this case and Barry, resps inform the Court

that the CA9 is now considering a case on similar facts.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:

For these reasons I recommend a grant.

Although the SG suggests that the Court might consider summary
reversal, I do not recommend it because the CAB's may be a reasonable
interpretation of Walter.

Moreover, plenary review in this case would

give the Court an opportunity to clarify the confusion created by the
lack of a majority opinion in the Walter case.

There is a response.
February 23, 19B3
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Memo to My Clerk:
Over the weekend I read preli.minari ly the briefs
in this case, and I do not think it necessary for me to have
a bench memo.
The Court below, CAS, relied on the plurality
opinion i.n Walter "·
film that had been

u.s., where federal officers viewed a

seize~

1awfu11v bv a private partv.

T

dissented in W.;lter, and still think i.t was wrongly decided.
Perhaps Walter can be distinguished, as is argued, on the
ground that viewi.nq a film is more intrusive than making a
chemical "field test" on a substance that already is
exposed.
In anv event,

I

am

quit~

familiar with

~he

area.

I wi 11., of course, want mv clerk • s ,, iews before I go to con-

ference.

L.F.P., ,Jr.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1167

BRADLEY~

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
THOMAS JACOBSEN AND DONNA MARIE JACOBSEN

()__

~ c!.£L~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 0--j ~
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
~~/JAI-A'J
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
During their examination of a damaged package, the employees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery
substance, originally concealed within eight layers of
wrappings. They summoned a federal agent, who removed
a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and determined that it was cocaine. The question presented is
whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain
a warrant before he did so.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Early in the morning of May 1, 1981, a supervisor at the Minneapolis-St. Paul
airport Federal Express office asked the office manager to
look at a package that had been damaged and tom by a forklift. They then opened the package in order to examine its
contents pursuant to a written company policy regarding insurance claims.
The container was an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in
brown paper. Inside the box five or six pieces of crumpled
newspaper covered a tube about about 10 inches long; the
tube was made of the silver tape used on basement ducts.
The supervisor and office manager cut open the tube, and
found a series of four zip-lock plastic bags, the outermost enclosing the other three and the innermost containing about
six and a half ounces of white powder. When they observed
the white powder in the innermost bag, they notified the

~- '

/ ' - - - '--'

82-1167-0PINION

2

UNITED STATES v. JACOBSEN

Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the first DEA
agent arrived, they replaced the plastic bags in the tube and
put the tube and the newspapers back into the box.
When the first federal agent arrived, the box, still
wrapped in brown paper, but with a hole punched in its side
and the top open, was placed on a desk. The agent saw that
one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed the four
plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of the
white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the
spof identified the substance as cocaine. 1
In due course, other agents arrived, made a second field
test, rewrapped the package, obtained a warrant to search
the place to w_bich it was addressed, executed the warrant,
and arrested respondents. After they were indicted for the
crime of possessing an illegal substance with intent to distribute, their motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that
the warrant was the product of an illegal search and seizure
was denied; they were tried and convicted, and appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the validity of
the search warrant depended on the validity of the agents'
warrantless test of the white powder/ that the testing constituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search,
'As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube
after another, it will cause liquids to take on ~certain sequence of colors.
Such a test discloses whether or not the substance is cocaine, but there is
no evidence that it would identify any other substances.
'The Court of Appeals did not hold that the facts would not have justified the issuance of a warrant without reference to the test results; the
court merely held that the facts recited in the warrant application, which
relied almost entirely on the results of the field tests, would not support
the issuance of the warrant if the field test was itself unlawful. "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court
may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention."
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413, n. 3 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964)). See Illinois v. Gates, U. S. - , (1983).
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and that a warrant was required. 683 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir.
1982).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, its decision conflicted
with a decision of another court of appeals on comparable
facts, United States v. Barry, 673 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U. S. - - (1982). 3 For that reason, and because field tests play an important role in the enforcement of
the narcotics laws, we granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - .
I
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " This text protects two
types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other
"seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. 4
A "seizure" of property occurs when a there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property. 5 This Court has also consistently
3
See also People v. Adler, 50 N. Y.2d 730, 409 N. E. 2d 888, 431
N. Y.S. 2d 412, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1014 (1980); cf. United States v.
Andrews, 618 F. 2d 646 (lOth Cir.) (upholding warrantless field test without discussion), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980).
•see Illinois v. Andreas,- U . S . - , - (1983); United States v.
Knotts,- U . S . - , - (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968).
• See United States v. Place,- U. S. - , (1983); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the result); Texas v. Brown, U. S. - ,
(STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76
(1906). While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed
in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the
"seizure" of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmentmeaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of
movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440, n. * (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); Brown
v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

- A~\0$3~
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construed this protection as proscribing only governmental
action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation
or knowledge of any governmental official." Walter v.
United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J.,
dissenting). 6
When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was delivered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an
"effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Letters and other sea
es are in the general class of effectsm
IC
e pub c at lar h.as a legitimate expectation
ofprivacy; w
ess-se c es of such effects are presumptively unreasonable. 7 Even when government agents may )
lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of
suspected contraband, the Fourth Amefldment requires that
they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such
a package. 8 Such a warrantless search could not be characterized as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. 9 ConU. S. 873, 878 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1, 16, 19, n. 16 (1968).
"See id., at 656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 660-Q61 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis,
428 U. S. 433, 455-456, n. 31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell , 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
7
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10 (1977); United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727,
733 (1878); see also Walter, 447 U. S., at 654-655 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
8
See, e. g., United States v. Place,- U.S. - , - (1983); United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809-812 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453
U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S.
753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13 and n. 8 (1977);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There is, of course,

a well recognized exception for customs searches; but that exception is not
involved in this case.
9
See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567, n. 11 (1971); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S.

7
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versely, in this case the fact that agents of the private carrier
independently opened the package and made an examination
that might have been impermissible for a government agent
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unreasonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that invasion occurred.
The initial invasions of respondents' package were occasioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the
package contained only one significant item, a suspicious
looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extracting its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of
white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or
deliberate, 10 and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of
their private character.
The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the
government agent must be tested by the de ee to which
they exceeded the scope o t e priVa e searc .
hat standar was a p
y a majority o the Court in Walter v.
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980). In Walter a private
party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion
picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the
carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later,
without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector
and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of
the Court, a majority did a ee on the a ro r·a e analysis of
a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private
one. Two Justices took the position that,
253, 261-262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959);
Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 312 (1958); United States v. DiRe,
332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927).
10
A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Express may
have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and
not because of damage from a forklift. However, the lower courts found
no governmental involvement in the private search, a finding not challenged by respondents. The affidavit thus is of no relevance to the issue
we decide.
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"If a properly authorized official search is limited by
the particular terms of its authorization, at least the
same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of another person's
privacy. ·Even though some circumstances-for example, if the results of the private search are in plain view
when materials are turned over to the Governmentmay justify the Government's reexamination of the materials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope
of the private search unless ff1ias tlie r1gl'i:t to make an
in epen en searc . In these cases, the private party
had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Government's screening one could only draw inferences about
what was on the films. The projection of the films was a
significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must
be characterized as a separate search." I d., at 657
(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote
omitted). 11

Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this characterization of the scope of the private search, were also of the
view that the legality of the governmental search must be
tested by the scope of the antecedant private search.
"Under these circumstances, since the L'Eggs employees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before
contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI's subsequent viewing of the movies on a projector did not
'change the nature of the search' and was not an additional search subject to the warrant requirement." I d.,
11
See also id., at 658-659 (footnotes omitted) ("The fact that the cartons
were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor's legitimate
expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion
of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection.").
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at 663-664 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by BURGER, C. J., POWELL & REHNQUIST, JJ.) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 592 F. 2d 788,
793-794 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Walter v. United
States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980)). 12
This standard follows from the analysis applicable when
private parties' reveal other kinds of private information to
the authorities. It is well-settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of the ori ·nal ex ectation of privac occurs, the Fourth
Amerufment does not pro "bit governmental use of t e nownonprivate information: "Tills ou
as held repeatedly that
the~ent does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443
(1975). 13 The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the
authorities use information with respect to which the expec12

In Walter, a majority of the Court found a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. For present purposes, the disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in that case with respect to the comparison between the private search and the official search is less significant than the
agreement on the standard to be applied in evaluating the relationship between the two searches.
13
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743-744 (1979); United States
v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U. S. 293, 300-303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 437-439 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). See also United States v. Henry,
447 U. S. 264, 272 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 744,
750-751 (1979).
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tation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a
case the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth
Amendment if they act without a warrant. 14
In this case, the federal agents' invasions of respondents'
privacy involved two steps: first, they removed the tube from
the box, the plastic bags from the tube and a trace of powder
from the innermost bag; second, they made a chemical test of
the powder. Although we ultimately conclude that both actions were reasonable for essentially the same reason, it is
useful to discuss them separately.
II

When the first federal agent on the scene initally saw the
package, he knew it contained nothing of significance except
a tube containing plastic bags and, ultimately, white powder.
It is not entirely clear that the powder was visible to him before he removed the tube from the box. 16 Even if the white
powder was not itself in "plain view" because it was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there
was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in
14
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961).
16
Daniel Stegemoller, the Federal Express office manager, testified at
the suppression hearing that the white substance was not visible without
reentering the package at the time the first agent arrived. Joint App.
42-43; 58. The magistrate's report contained a finding that the gray tube
and powder were in plain view, which respondents challenged before the
District Court. The District Court declined to resolve respondents' objection, ruling that fact immaterial and assuming for purposes of its decision
"that the newspaper in the box covered the gray tube and that neither the
gray tube nor the contraband could be seen when the box was turned over
the the DEA agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. At trial, the federal agent first on the scene testified that the powder was not visible until
after he pulled the plastic bags out of the tube. Joint App. 71-72. As our
discussion will make clear, we agree with the District Court that it does
not matter whether the loose piece of newspaper covered the tube at the
time the agent first saw the box.
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the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its
contents would not tell him anything more than he already
had been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Government could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony
concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it
hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to reexamine the contents of the package. The advantage the
Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of
a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further
infringing respondents' privacy. Protecting the risk of misdescription hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest,
and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 16
Thus, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the
agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent
to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during
the private search. 17 It infringed no legitimate expectation
of privacy and hence was not a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
While the agents' assertion of dominion and control over
16
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 750-751 (1979); United
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Osborn, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); On Lee v. United States,
343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). For example, in Lopez v. United States,
373 U. S. 427 (1963), the Court wrote: "Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely
on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence . . . . For no other
argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that
the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner
took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would
be accurately reproduced in court .... " !d., at 439 (footnote omitted).
17
Moreover, since the Federal Express employees had of their own accord invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of
viewing the contents of the package, the agent's viewing of what a private
party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476-476 (1921).

,.
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the package and its contents did constitute a "seizure," 18 that
seizure was not unreasonable. The fact that, prior to the
field test, respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the
package had been largely compromised, is highly relevant to
the reasonableness of the agents' conduct in this respect.
The examination of the tube and the powder it contained was
comparable to the police officer's observation of a balloon
"the distinctive character [of which] itself spoke volumes as
to its contents, particularly to the trained eye of the officer."
V Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (plurality opinion); see also id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in the judg;:.ment). The balloon was like the hypothetical gun case irYArkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), both of which are
containers which "by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can
be inferred from their outward appearance." I d., at
764-765, n. 13. Such containers may be_seized, at least temporarily, without a warranC on probable cause. 19 Accordingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags
contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure
was reasonable. 20 It is well-settled that it is constitutionally
reasonable for law enforcement officials may seize "effects"
that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy withBoth the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took
custody of the package from Federal Express· after they arrived. Although respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a
"seizure," though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which
the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter.
19
See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982); Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 428-428 (1981) (plurality opinion).
2ll Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the
package contained contraband.
~ee Place,- U.S., a t - ; Texas v. Brown,- U.S., a t - ;
18

L.~ . ~~
~/"th-e-~

· ~~
~'f~
~
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out a warrant based on probable caus to believe they contain
-contraband. 21
III
The uestion remains whether the additional intrusion occasioned by the fiel test, which had not been conducted by
the Federal Express agents and therefore exceeded the
scope of the private search, was an unlawful "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent-whether or not a suspicious
white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more,
not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder.
We must first determine whether this can be considered a
"search" subject to the Fourth Amendment-did it infringe
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable?
The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities. 22 Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that

id., at-- (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U. S. 338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968)
(per curiam).

"Obviously, however, a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy by definition
means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one
which the law recognizes as 'legitimate.' His presence, in the words of ~
Jones [v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 267 (1960)], is 'wrongful,' his expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily
on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
22
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Government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to
a governmental informant, despite the criminal's reasonable
expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential
information to the authorities. See United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent
on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed by this record would
result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative-merely disclosing that the substance is something other
than cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has decided-and there is no question about
its power to do so-to treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably "private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
23
interest.
This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place,-U. S. - - (1983), in which the Court held that subjecting
luggage to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). See also United
States v. Knotts, U. S. (1983) (use of a beeper to track car's
movements infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy).
23
See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is confined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the
purely "private" possession of an article that cannot be distributed in commerce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969).

1

~
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was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment:
"A 'canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection
dog, however, does not require opening of the luggage.
It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is
obtained through this investigative technique is much
less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff
tells the authorities something about the contents of the
luggage, the information obtained is limited." ld., at
24

Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the
kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment.
We have concluded, in part II, supra, that the initial "seizure" of the package and its contents was reasonable. Nevertheless, as Place also holds, a seizure lawful at its inception
can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its
manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
"unreasonable seizures." 25 Here, the field test did affect re24
Respondents attempt to distinguish Place arguing that it involved no
physical invasion of Place's effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. However, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon
any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully applicable here.
25
In Place, the Court held that while the initial seizure of luggage for the
purpose of subjecting it to a "dog sniff" test was reasonable, the seizure

,.
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spondents' possessory interests protected by the Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it converted what had been only a temporary deprivation of
possessory interests into a permanent one. To assess the
reasonableness of this conduct, "[w]e must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Id., at

--.

26

Applying this test, we,_conclude
' that the destruction of the
powder during the course of the field test was reasonable.
The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure' were
substantial; the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material
was involved, the loss of which appears to have gone unnoticed by respondents, and since the property had already
been lawfully detained, the "seizure" could, at most, have
only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest.
Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 591-592 (1974) (plurality opinion) (examination of automobile's tires and taking of
paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of constitutional
interests). 27 Under these circumstances, the safeguards of a
warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment
interests. This warrantless "seizure" was reasonable. 28
became unreasonable because its length unduly intruded upon constitutionally protected interests. See id ., at - .
26
See, e. g., Michigan v. Long,- U. S. - , (1983); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53~7 (1967).
27
In fact, respondents do not contend that the amount of material tested
was large enough to make it possible for them to have detected its loss.
The only description in the record of the amount of cocaine seized is that
"[i]t was a trace amount." Joint App. 75.
26
See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search and
seizure limited to scraping suspect's fingernails justified even when full

\
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In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been
frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent
that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the infringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

search may not be). Cf. Place, - - U. S., at-- (approving brief warrantless seizure of luggage for purposes of "sniff test" based on its minimal
intrusiveness and reasonable belief that the luggage contained contraband); Van Leeuwen v. United States, 397 U. S. 249, 252-253 (1970) (detention of package on reasonable suspicion was justified since detention infringed no "significant Fourth Amendment interest"). Of course, where
more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of
exigent circumstances. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S.
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977).
We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material
is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the "white
powder" he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and
subject it to a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable
seizure.
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JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
During their examination of a damaged package, the employees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery
substance, originally concealed within eight layers of
wrappings. They summoned a federal agent, who removed
a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and determined that it was cocaine. The question presented is
whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain
a warrant before he did so.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Early in the morning of May 1, 1981, a supervisor at the Minneapolis-St. Paul
airport Federal Express office asked the office manager to
look at a package that had been damaged and torn by a forklift. They then opened the package in order to examine its
contents pursuant to a written company policy regarding insurance claims.
The container was an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in
brown paper. Inside the box five or six pieces of crumpled
newspaper covered a tube about 10 inches long; the tube was
made of the silver tape used on basement ducts. The supervisor and office manager cut open the tube, and found a series
of four zip-lock plastic bags, the outermost enclosing the
other three and the innermost containing about six and a half
ounces of white powder. When they observed the white
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powder in the innermost bag, they notified the Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the first DEA agent arrived, they replaced the plastic bags in the tube and put the
tube and the newspapers back into the box.
When the first federal agent arrived, the box, still
wrapped in brown paper, but with a hole punched in its side
and the top open, was placed on a desk. The agent saw that
one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed the four
plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of the
white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the
spot identified the substance as cocaine. 1
In due course, other agents arrived, made a second field
test, rewrapped the package, obtained a warrant to search
the place to which it was addressed, executed the warrant,
and arrested respondents. After they were indicted for the
crime of possessing an illegal substance with intent to distribute, their motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that
the warrant was the product of an illegal search and seizure
was denied; they were tried and convicted, and appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the validity of
the search warrant depended on the validity of the agents'
warrantless test of the white powder/ that the testing con' As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube
after another, it will cause liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors.
Such a test discloses whether or not the substance is cocaine, but there is
no evidence that it would identify any other substances.
2
The Court of Appeals did not hold that the facts would not have justified the issuance of a warrant without reference to the test results; the
court merely held that the facts recited in the warrant application, which
relied almost entirely on the results of the field tests , would not support
the issuance of the warrant if the field test was itself unlawful. "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court
may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention."
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413, n. 3 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964)). See Illinois v. Gates , 462 U. S. - - , - - (1983).
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stituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search,
and that a warrant was required. 683 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir.
1982).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, its decision conflicted
with a decision of another court of appeals on comparable
facts, United States v. Barry, 673 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U. S. - - (1982). 3 For that reason, and because field tests play an important role in the enforcement of
the narcotics laws, we granted certiorari, 460 U. S. - - .
I
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." This text protects two
types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other
"seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. 4 A "seizure" of property occurs when a there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property. 5 This Court has also consistently
3
See also People v. Adler, 50 N. Y. 2d 730, 409 N. E. 2d 888, 431
N. Y. S. 2d 412, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1014 (1980); cf. United States v.
Andrews, 618 F. 2d 646 (CA 10) (upholding warrantless field test without
discussion), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980).
' See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. ,(1983); United States v.
Knotts , 460 U. S. ,(1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968).
5
See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. - , (1983); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J ., concurring in the result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.-, (1983) (STEVENS, J. , concurring in the judgment); see also United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76
(1906). While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed
in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the
"seizure" of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmentmeaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of
movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440, n. * (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J .); Brown
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construed this protection as proscribing only governmental
action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation
or knowledge of any governmental official." Walter v.
United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J.,
dissenting). 6
When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was delivered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an
"effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation
of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable. 7 Even when government agents may
lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of
suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that
they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such
a package. 8 Such a warrantless search could not be characterized as reasonable simply because, after the official invav. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni·Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Da·
vis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1, 16, 19, n. 16 (1968).
6
See id., at 656 (opinion of STEVENS, J .); id., at 660-661 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis,
428 U. S. 433, 455-456, n. 31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
7
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10 (1977); United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727,
733 (1878); see also Walter, 447 U.S., at 654-655 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
8
See, e. g. , United States v. Place, 462 U. S. - , - (1983); United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809--812 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453
U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S.
753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13 and n. 8 (1977);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There is, of course,
a well recognized exception for customs searches; but that exception is not
involved in this case.
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sion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. 9 Conversely, in this case the fact that agents of the private carrier
independently opened the package and made an examination
that might have been impermissible for a government agent
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unreasonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that invasion occurred.
The initial invasions of respondents' package were occasioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the
package contained only one significant item, a suspiciO\lS
looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extracting its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of
white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or
deliberate, 10 and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of
their private character.
The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the
government agent must be tested by the degree to which
they exceeded the scope of the private search. That standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in Walter v.
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980). In Walter a private
party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion
picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the
carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later,
without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector
9
See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567, n. 11 (1971); Wong Sun v.
United States , 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963); R ios v. United States, 364 U. S.
253, 261-262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959);
Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 312 (1958); United States v. DiRe,
332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States , 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927).
10
A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Express may
have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and
not because of damage from a forklift. However, the lower courts found
no governmental involvement in the private search, a finding not challenged by respondents. The affidavit thus is of no relevance to the issue
we decide.
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and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of
the Court, a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of
a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private
one. Two Justices took the position:
"If a properly authorized official search is limited by
the particular terms of its authorization, at least the
same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of another person's
privacy. Even though some circumstances-for example, if the results of the private search are in plain view
when materials are turned over to the Governmentmay justify the Government's reexamination of the materials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope
of the private search unless it has the right to make an
independent search. In these cases, the private party
had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Government's screening one could only draw inferences about
what was on the films. The projection of the films was a
significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must
be characterized as a separate search." I d., at 657
(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote
omitted). 11
Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this characterization of the scope of the private search, were also of the
view that the legality of the governmental search must be
tested by the scope of the antecedent private search.
"Under these circumstances, since the L'Eggs employees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before
contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI's subseSee also i d., at 658-659 (footnotes omitted) ("The fact that the cartons
were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor's legitimate
expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion
of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection").
11
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quent viewing of the movies on a projector did not
'change the nature of the search' and was not an additional search subject to the warrant requirement." !d.,
at 663--664 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by BuRGER, C. J., POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.) (footnote
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 592 F. 2d
788, 793--794 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Walter v.
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980)). 12
This standard follows from the analysis applicable when
private parties reveal other kinds of private information to
the authorities. It is well-settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the nownonprivate information: "This Court has held repeatedly that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be
betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443
(1975). 13 The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the
12

In Walter, a majority of the Court found a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. For present purposes, the disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in that case with respect to the comparison between the private search and the official search is less significant than the
agreement on the standard to be applied in evaluating the relationship between the two searches.
13
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743--744 (1979); United States
v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U. S. 293, 300-303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 437-439 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U. S. 747, 753--754 (1952). See also United States v. Henry,
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authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a
case the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth
Amendment if they act without a warrant. 14
In this case, the federal agents' invasions of respondents'
privacy involved two steps: first, they removed the tube from
the box, the plastic bags from the tube and a trace of powder
from the innermost bag; second, they made a chemical test of
the powder. Although we ultimately conclude that both actions were reasonable for essentially the same reason, it is
useful to discuss them separately.
II
When the first federal agent on the scene initally saw the
package, he knew it contained nothing of significance except
a tube containing plastic bags and, ultimately, white powder.
It is not entirely clear that the powder was visible to him before he removed the tube from the box. 15 Even if the white
powder was not itself in "plain view" because it was still en447 U. S. 264, 272 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 744,
750-751 (1979).
"See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961).
5
' Daniel Stegemoller, the Federal Express office manager, testified at
the suppression hearing that the white substance was not visible without
reentering the package at the time the first agent arrived. Joint App.
42--43; 58. The magistrate's report contained a finding that the gray tube
and powder were in plain view, which respondents challenged before the
District Court. The District Court declined to resolve respondents' objection, ruling that fact immaterial and assuming for purposes of its decision
"that the newspaper in the box covered the gray tube and that neither the
gray tube nor the contraband could be seen when the box was turned over
the the DEA agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. At trial, the federal agent first on the scene testified that the powder was not visible until
after he pulled the plastic bags out of the tube. Joint App. 71-72. As our
discussion will make clear, we agree with the District Court that it does
not matter whether the loose piece of newspaper covered the tube at the
time the agent first saw the box.
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closed in so many containers and covered with papers, there
was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in
the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its
contents would not tell him anything more than he already
had been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Government could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony
concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it
hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to reexamine the contents of the package. The advantage the
Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of
a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further
infringing respondents' privacy. Protecting the risk of misdescription hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest,
and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 16
Thus, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the
agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent
to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during
the private search. 17 It infringed no legitimate expectation
of privacy and hence was not a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 750-751 (1979); United
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Osborn, 385 U. S. 323, 32&-331 (1966); On Lee v. United States,
343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). For example, in Lopez v. United States,
373 U. S. 427 (1963), the Court wrote: "Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely
on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence . .. . For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the
agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner
took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would
be accurately reproduced in court . .. ." Id., at 439 (footnote omitted).
"Moreover, since the Federal Express employees had of their own accord invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of
viewing the contents of the package, the agent's viewing of what a private
party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476-476 (1921).
16
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While the agents' assertion of dominion and control over
the package and its contents did constitute a "seizlire," 18 that
seizure was not unreasonable. The fact that, prior to the
field test, respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the
package had been largely compromised, is highly relevant to
the reasonableness of the agents' conduct in this respect. In
light of what the agents already knew about the contents of
the package, it was as if the contents were in plain view.
The examination of the tube and the powder it contained was
comparable to the police officer's observation of a balloon
"the distinctive character [of which] itself spoke volumes as
to its contents, particularly to the trained eye of the officer."
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (plurality opinion); see also id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). The balloon was like the hypothetical gun case in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), both of which are
containers which "by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can
be inferred from their outward appearance." I d., at
764-765, n. 13. Such containers may be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant on probable cause. 19 Accordingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags
contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure
was reasonable, 20 for it is well-settled that it is constitution18
Both the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took
custody of the package from Federal Express after they arrived. Although respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a
"seizure," though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which
the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter.
19
See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982); Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 428-428 (1981) (plurality opinion).
20
Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the
package contained contraband. Therefore we need not decide whether the
agents could have seized the package based on something less than proba-
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ally reasonable for law enforcement officials may seize "effects" that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy
without a warrant based on probable cause to believe they
contain contraband. 21
III
The question remains whether the additional intrusion occasioned by the field test, which had not been conducted by
the Federal Express agents and therefore exceeded the
scope of the private search, was an unlawful "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent-whether or not a suspicious
white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more,
not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder.
We must first determine whether this can be considered a
"search" subject to the Fourth Amendment-did it infringe
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable?
The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities. 22 Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that
ble cause. Some seizures can be justified by an articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. - - (1983).
21
See Place, 462 U. S., at--; Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S., at--; id.,
a t - - (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G. M . Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S.
338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) (per
curiam).
22
"Obviously, however, a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy by definition
means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one
which the law recognizes as 'legitimate.' His presence, in the words of
Jones [v. United States , 362 U. S. 257, 267 (1960)], is 'wrongful,' his expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' Katz v. United States , 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to
a governmental informant, despite the criminal's reasonable
expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential
information to the authorities. See United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent
on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed by this record would
result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative-merely disclosing that the substance is something other
than cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has decided-and there is no question about
its power to do so-to treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably "private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
interest. 23
And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily
on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). See also United
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. - - (1983) (use of a beeper to track car's movements infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U. S. 735 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed
infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy).
23
See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is confined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the
purely "private" possession of an article that cannot be distributed in commerce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969).
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This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place, 462
U. S. - - (1983), in which the Court held that subjecting
luggage to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection
dog was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment:
"A 'canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection
dog, however, does not require opening of the luggage.
It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is
obtained through this investigative technique is much
less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff
tells the authorities something about the contents of the
luggage, the information obtained is limited." ld., at
24

Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the
kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment.
We have concluded, in Part II, supra, that the initial "seizure" of the package and its contents was reasonable. N evertheless, as Place also holds, a seizure lawful at its inception
can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its
manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
"' Respondents attempt to distinguish Place arguing that it involved no
physical invasion of Place's effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. However, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon
any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully applicable here.
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"unreasonable seizures." 25 Here, the field test did affect respondents' possessory interests protected by the Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it converted what had been only a temporary deprivation of
possessory interests into a permanent one. To assess the
reasonableness of this conduct, "[w]e must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." /d., at

--. 26
Applying this test, we conclude that the destruction of the
powder during the course of the field test was reasonable.
The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were
substantial; the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material
was involved, the loss of which appears to have gone unnoticed by respondents, and since the property had already
been lawfully detained, the "seizure" could, at most, have
only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest.
Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 591-592 (1974) (plurality opinion) (examination of automobile's tires and taking of
paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of constitutional
interests). 27 Under these circumstances, the safeguards of a
25

In Place, the Court held that while the initial seizure of luggage for the
purpose of subjecting it to a "dog sniff" test was reasonable , the seizure
became unreasonable because its length unduly intruded upon constitutionally protected interests. See id., at - .
26
See, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. - , (1983); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53!H>37 (1967).
?:1 In fact, respondents do not contend that the amount of material tested
was large enough to make it possible for them to have detected its loss.
The only description in the record of the amount of cocaine seized is that
"[i]t was a trace amount." Joint App. 75.
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warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment
interests. This warrantless "seizure" was reasonable. 28
In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been
frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent
that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the infringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

28
See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search and
seizure limited to scraping suspect's fingernails justified even when full
search may not be). Cf. Place, 462 U. S., at-- (approving brief warrantless seizure of luggage for purposes of "sniff test" based on its minimal
intrusiveness and reasonable belief that the luggage contained contraband); Van Leeuwen v. United States , 397 U. S. 249, 252-253 (1970) (detention of package on reasonable suspicion was justified since detention infringed no "significant Fourth Amendment interest"). Of course, where
more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of
exigent circumstances. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S.
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977).
We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material
is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the "white
powder" he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and
subject it to a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable
seizure.
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